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USPTO Guidance on Design Patents for AR, VR, and Computer Interfaces
Computer-Generated Design Guidance Background
Back in 2020, the USPTO asked for public input on “whether its interpretation of the article of manufacture requirement in the United States Code should be revised to protect digital designs that encompass new and emerging technologies.”
Nineteen comments were submitted. Twelve advocated that designs for projections, holograms, and virtual and augmented reality should be eligible for design patent protection.
Outdated USPTO Guidance Needed Update to Reflect Emerging Technology
In Nov 2023, the USPTO responded by publishing supplemental guidance. This would help determine whether a design claim including computer-generated electronic images constituted statutory subject matter under 35 USC 171.
However, the guidance didn’t address designs involving virtual or augmented reality. Following the publication of that guidance, the USPTO received additional public comments requesting clarification. Commenters noted that modern interfaces increasingly appear in projections, holograms, and virtual or augmented reality environments, rather than only on traditional computer displays or monitors.
Seven additional comments were submitted requesting further guidance.
Revised PTO Guidance Covers Newer Tech
On Friday March 13, 2026, the USPTO issued supplemental guidance. The guidance explains when computer-generated interfaces, icons, and emerging digital visuals can qualify for design patent protection.
This update reflects the reality that modern interfaces now appear in augmented reality, virtual reality, holograms, and projections, not just on traditional screens.
Image of a projection of a keyboard. One of the examples taken from the USPTO guidance.
1. Interfaces and icons can still be design-patent eligible
Design patents still require a design for an “article of manufacture.” Traditionally, this meant a graphical user interface or icon displayed on a computer screen or display panel.
The USPTO now confirms that computer-generated interfaces and icons can still qualify as design patent subject matter. However, they must be tied to a computer, computer system, or display and must be more than a disembodied image.
2. You no longer need to show a display screen in the drawings
Previously, design patent drawings typically had to show a display panel (often in broken lines) surrounding a GUI or icon. Under the new guidance:
- A display screen does not have to appear in the drawings
- As long as the title and claim clearly identify the article of manufacture, for example:
- “Icon for a display screen”
- “Graphical user interface for a computer system”
Inventors can still include a screen in the drawings if they want, but it is no longer mandatory.
3. AR, VR, projections, and holograms may be patentable designs
The USPTO explicitly states that designs such as:
- projections
- holograms
- augmented-reality interfaces
- virtual-reality interfaces
may qualify for design patents even if they are not displayed on a traditional monitor.
What matters is that the design is for a computer system and is not merely a floating, unrelated image.
The design must still be clearly disclosed
Even with this flexibility, applicants must still satisfy normal patent requirements. In particular:
- The drawings must clearly show the design
- There must be enough views to fully disclose the appearance
- The design must be ornamental, not purely functional
- The disclosure must meet clarity and enablement requirements
Claim wording matters
The USPTO now accepts claim language such as:
- “Icon for display screen”
- “GUI for display panel”
- “Projected interface for a computer”
- “Virtual reality interface for a computer”
- “Augmented reality interface for a computer”
These phrases properly link the design to an article of manufacture, satisfying the statute.
Pure images without a device connection are still not patentable
A stand-alone image or picture that is not tied to a computer, display, or computer system will still fail the article-of-manufacture requirement and be rejected.
For other articles related to design patents, see: The Latest Case in Enforcement of Design Patents
FishFAQ Trademark Video 3: Levels of Distinctiveness
This is the third installment in our series of FishFAQ videos directed towards Trademarks. This third video covers the different levels of distinctiveness.
Distinctiveness is an important concept in the eligibility of a mark for registration. The measure of a mark’s ability to identify the specific source or goods or services is dependent in great part on how distinctive the name is. The USPTO has identified five levels of distinctiveness in trademark law. This video explains how it works.
This series is an extension of our initial Patent FishFAQ series.
If videos aren’t your thing, we also have extensive text Patent and Trademark FAQ sections.
and though no videos have been made for Copyright questions, there is a text Copyright FAQ page too.
FishFAQ Trademark Video: Types of Trademarks
This is the second of a new series of FishFAQ videos directed towards Trademarks. This second video covers the different types of marks.
Trademarks are used for goods, while service marks are used for services.
A third type is the word mark, which seeks protection over the word itself, beyond any particular design.
The video also talks about non-traditional marks.
This series is an extension of our initial Patent FishFAQ series.
If videos aren’t your thing, we also have extensive text Patent and Trademark FAQ sections.
and though no videos have been made for Copyright questions, there is a text Copyright FAQ page too.
USPTO Examiner Conflict-of-Interest Settlement: $500k
USPTO Examiner Agrees to $500,000 Conflict-of-Interest Settlement
A major USPTO examiner conflict settlement is drawing attention to ethics oversight inside the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Patent examiner Daxin Wu has agreed to pay $500,000 to resolve allegations that she reviewed patent applications from companies in which she held substantial stock—far exceeding federal ethics limits.
The U.S. Department of Justice announced the civil settlement on February 25, 2026. Between 2019 and 2022 Wu examined at least nine applications involving companies where she owned hundreds of thousands of dollars in stock, including over $900,000 in one company’s competitor.
Federal regulations (5 C.F.R. § 2640.202) allow examiners to hold no more than $15,000 in a single company under review or $25,000 across an industry sector—amounts dwarfed by Wu’s alleged holdings.
Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law and Ethics Reform Act Explained
The allegations underlying this USPTO examiner conflict settlement center on 18 U.S.C. § 208, a criminal conflict-of-interest statute barring executive branch employees from participating personally and substantially in matters affecting their financial interests. Willful violations can carry up to five years’ imprisonment.
However, the matter was resolved civilly under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, without any admission of liability. There is no public indication of disciplinary action beyond the financial penalty, and the DOJ press release describes Wu in the present tense as a USPTO examiner.
Inspector General Report Found Systemic USPTO Ethics Failures
The case follows a 2024 report by the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General. That report concluded the USPTO and the Department of Commerce failed to effectively administer their ethics program for patent examiners.
In a sample of 73 examiners, 26 had potential financial conflicts that ethics officials failed to identify. Projecting that rate across approximately 7,000 examiners required to file confidential financial disclosure reports, the OIG estimated that roughly 30% may have had undiscovered conflicts in 2022.
The Wu matter appears to be the first public enforcement action to emerge from those referrals, making this USPTO examiner conflict settlement particularly significant in light of the OIG’s findings.
Confidential Financial Disclosures and Oversight Gaps
Patent examiners at GS-13 through GS-15 must file annual confidential financial disclosure reports (CFDRs), listing assets and stock holdings over $1,000.
These reports are reviewed internally by ethics officials but are not publicly available, limiting external scrutiny.
The OIG also identified inconsistent ethics guidance. Some examiners reportedly believed they could hold up to $50,000 in industry stock without triggering recusal obligations. This is about double the actual regulatory cap. While that misunderstanding does not approach the magnitude of Wu’s alleged holdings, it suggests broader compliance and training issues that give context to the USPTO examiner conflict settlement.
The complexity of applying “industry sector” rules makes accurate conflict monitoring challenging. This is especially true in technology art units covering large swaths of the software market. The oversight system is intended to catch what self-reporting may miss.
What Happens to the Patents She Examined?
The settlement resolves the government’s civil claims against the examiner. It does not address the legal status of the patents she examined.
Those patents remain in force. Patent law doctrines such as inequitable conduct focus on applicant misconduct, not examiner conflicts. The presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 centers on the substantive quality of examination, not the examiner’s financial interests. Courts have generally avoided probing examiner motivations, effectively treating the examination process as a legal “black box.”
Federal Circuit Decisions Highlight Ethics Threshold Differences
The situation also underscores differences within the executive branch ethics framework. In Centripetal Networks, LLC v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that an administrative patent judge’s stock ownership within the $1,001 to $15,000 de minimis range did not require vacatur of PTAB decisions.
By contrast, the same court previously vacated a $1.9 billion district court judgment after finding that an Article III judge’s spouse owned $4,700 in Cisco stock—requiring disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 regardless of how small the holding was.
Wu’s alleged stock positions were far beyond the regulatory gray zone addressed in those cases.
The Bigger Question: Is the USPTO Ethics System Fixed?
It has been two years after the OIG’s recommendations were accepted. As of now, there is no publicly available follow-up audit confirming whether corrective measures were fully implemented. The $500,000 USPTO examiner conflict settlement may represent accountability for one examiner whose alleged conduct was particularly egregious.
But the OIG’s projection—that roughly 30% of sampled examiners had potential undetected conflicts—raises broader institutional questions. If that estimate was accurate, the issue may extend well beyond a single settlement.
Apple v. Squires: The Federal Circuit Confirms the Director’s (Nearly) Unlimited IPR Discretion
On Friday the 13th, the Federal Circuit turned what began as a procedural APA challenge into something much larger: a precedential confirmation that the USPTO Director possesses extraordinarily broad discretion over whether to institute inter partes review (IPR).
In Apple Inc. v. Squires, the court did far more than uphold the now-obsolete NHK/Fintiv framework. It effectively declared that the Director’s institution authority is constrained only by the Constitution — or by whatever limits the Director chooses to impose on himself.
The Origin: NHK and Fintiv
The controversy began when former Director Iancu designated as precedential two PTAB decisions:
Together, those cases established six non-exclusive factors — the “Fintiv factors” — guiding discretionary denial of IPR when there is parallel district court litigation. The factors emphasized judicial efficiency, trial timing, overlap of issues, and related considerations.
Apple and several other technology companies challenged the adoption of these factors, arguing that the USPTO violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to use notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The Statutory Wall: “Final and Nonappealable”
The challenge ran into 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), which provides that institution decisions are “final and nonappealable.”
The Supreme Court has interpreted that language broadly in:
- Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee
- SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu
Those decisions make clear that the Director’s choice whether to institute IPR is largely insulated from judicial review.
Initially, the district court dismissed Apple’s case as unreviewable. The Federal Circuit briefly revived it — but only on a narrow procedural question: whether adoption of the Fintiv factors required notice-and-comment rulemaking. Substantive review of institution discretion remained off the table.
The Critical Reframing: “Instructions,” Not Rules
On remand, the district court held that the Fintiv factors were exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking because they were not “substantive rules.”
When the case returned to the Federal Circuit in Apple v. Squires, the panel took an even more consequential step. It reframed the Fintiv factors not as rules governing a quasi-judicial body, but as “instructions” from the Director to his subordinates at the PTAB.
That shift changed everything.
Because the Director is the statutory decisionmaker, and because the Fintiv instructions did not bind the Director himself, the court held they were merely “general statements of policy” — expressly exempt from APA notice-and-comment requirements.
The logic was straightforward but sweeping: Only rules that bind the Director’s own discretion could qualify as substantive. Guidance the Director gives to others about how to exercise his discretion does not.
No Right to Institution Means No APA Hook
The Federal Circuit reinforced its conclusion with an even broader principle: there is no legal right to IPR institution.
Congress created IPR as a discretionary regime. A denial of institution:
- Does not invalidate or alter patent rights.
- Does not prevent validity challenges in district court.
- Does not foreclose reexamination.
In short, a non-institution decision leaves a challenger in exactly the same legal position it would have occupied had Congress never created IPR at all.
Because no legal rights are altered, rules discouraging institution cannot be “substantive” in a way that triggers APA procedural protections. This reasoning significantly narrows the scope of possible APA challenges going forward.
The Irony: Apple Won the Battle, Lost the War
Apple’s goal was to cabin discretionary denials and require formal rulemaking. Instead, the litigation produced binding precedent establishing the opposite principle.
The Federal Circuit made clear:
- Institution decisions are substantively unreviewable.
- Internal guidance on how to deny institution does not require notice-and-comment rulemaking.
- Only rules binding the Director himself could potentially be substantive.
- Non-institution does not affect legal rights in a way that triggers APA protections.
Even More Discretion Today
Compounding the impact, institutional changes during the appeal centralized authority even further. Acting Director Stewart rescinded prior Fintiv guidance and restructured review procedures. Director Squires later indicated he would personally decide institution questions based on both discretionary and merits factors.
The result is a regime even more concentrated than the one Apple originally challenged — with discretionary denial no longer meaningfully cabined by the Fintiv framework.
The Bottom Line: Nearly Unbounded Authority
The practical effect of Apple v. Squires is profound.
The USPTO Director now possesses institution authority that is, for all practical purposes, nearly unbounded:
- No notice-and-comment rulemaking required for discretionary guidance.
- No substantive judicial review of denial decisions.
- No recognized legal entitlement to institution.
- Only possible limits: constitutional constraints or self-imposed restrictions.
In trying to rein in discretionary denial, Apple secured a precedential ruling that cements it. The Director’s authority over IPR institution is now clearer than ever — and broader than when the case began.
USPTO Adds Design Search Codes for Sound and Motion Trademarks
The USPTO recently updated its Design Search Code Manual to include codes for sound and motion marks. These updates make it easier for applicants to search for existing marks that are similar to theirs.
Previously, searches relied on keywords in the mark description — which could miss some relevant marks. Now, the new codes let you search by categories such as:
- Music
- Human speech
- Animal sounds
- Instruments
- Motion
For businesses or creators registering sound or motion marks, this update provides a faster and more accurate way to identify potential conflicts.
Try our FAQ page: Non-Traditional Trademarks
Do USPTO Fee Discounts Hurt Inventors’ Chances? Probably Not.
Recent USPTO data shows a sharp gap in patent allowance rates by entity size. Large entities saw about an 80% allowance rate, small entities around 61%, and micro-entities just 40%. At first glance, it’s tempting to suspect that USPTO fee discounts come with consideration discounts too.
That’s almost certainly the wrong conclusion.
Why USPTO Fee Discounts Do Not Affect Patent Examination
USPTO examiners are not incentivized based on applicant size or fee status. Entity classification affects what applicants pay—not how claims are examined. There’s no procedural hook for “micro-entity skepticism” baked into the system.
If discounted fees were driving worse outcomes, we’d expect to see some evidence of that in examiner behavior. We don’t.
The Real Reason Micro-Entity Patent Allowance Rates Are Lower
A more plausible explanation is structural, not institutional.
Micro-entities are disproportionately individual inventors. Unlike large companies, they typically lack internal screening processes that filter out weaker inventions before filing. Corporations reject many invention disclosures internally and file only after patentability and business value have both been vetted.
Individual inventors, by contrast, are closer to their inventions and often filing without:
- Broad prior-art visibility
- Repeated exposure to what doesn’t patent well
- Institutional memory of past prosecution failures
That difference alone can account for a lot of the disparity.
Why Patent Prosecution Resources and Stamina Matter
Patentability isn’t binary. Many patentable inventions still require:
- Multiple office-action responses
- Claim narrowing
- RCEs or appeals
Large entities budget for that reality. Micro-entities often don’t. When costs rise faster than perceived value, abandonment becomes rational—even for inventions that could have issued.
Lower allowance rates may therefore reflect earlier exits, not weaker inventions.
How Individual Inventors Can Improve Their Patent Allowance Odds
None of this is destiny. Inventors can materially improve their odds by borrowing a few habits from larger players:
- Be selective. Not every good idea needs a patent. File where narrower claims would still matter.
- Invest early in patentability analysis. Modest upfront diligence can prevent expensive dead ends.
- Treat the provisional as real work. Weak disclosures constrain everything that follows.
- Budget for prosecution, not just filing. Persistence is often the difference between issuance and abandonment.
- Define success realistically. A narrower, enforceable patent is often better than chasing broad claims that never issue.
What USPTO Patent Allowance Data Actually Shows
The data does not suggest that the USPTO fee discounts disfavor applicants. It suggests that scale brings discipline, resources, and endurance, all of which improve patent outcomes.
For inventors, the lesson isn’t that the system is biased—it’s that smart selection, solid drafting, and realistic prosecution planning matter just as much as the invention itself.
Check out another of our articles on entity sizes: When Trying to Save Money May Cost More