NEWS

The Supreme Court recently decided, in Vidal v Elster, that the TTAB’s refusal to register the TRUMP TOO SMALL mark, was not a violation of First Amendment rights.

Registration Application and Refusal

Back in 2018, Steve Elster sought to register a mark of “TRUMP TOO SMALL” as a t-shirt slogan, inspired by an exchange between Trump and Marco Rubio during the 2016 Republican primary. The PTO examiner refused on the grounds that the mark violated the ‘names clause’ of the Lanham Act, which requires written consent for a mark containing the name of a living individual. Elster countered that the ‘names clause’ was a violation of his first amendment free-speech rights, but the examiner responded that refusing registration doesn’t constitute a restriction on free speech. For reference, the PTO has also refused trademark registrations on “WELCOME PRESIDENT BIDEN”, “I STUMP FOR TRUMP”, and “OBAMA PAJAMA”.

Elster appealed the decision before the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board, but the TTAB affirmed the original decision barring Elster from registering the mark.

Federal Circuit in Re: Elster (Feb 24 2022)

Elster appealed the TTAB decision before the Federal Circuit. The Court noted that section 2 of the Lanham Act requires the PTO to refuse registration of certain categories of proposed trademarks. But in the last five years, the Supreme Court held two provisions in section 2 unconstitutional.

While the Federal Circuit acknowledged the TTAB’s point that the registration bar doesn’t “prevent Elster from communicating his message, it can legally disadvantage the speech at issue here.”

The Fed Circuit stated that it is one of the prerogatives of American citizenship to criticize public men. In fact, the first amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech concerning public officials. Therefore, suppressing the right to praise or criticize governmental agents can’t be squared with the first amendment.

While this right was acknowledged by the TTAB, the government’s interest in protecting privacy and publicity rights was seen to outweigh it. The Federal court argued here that Trump, as a public political figure can’t expect privacy. It further noted that one of the fundamental reasons for trademarks in the first place is the need to safeguard against the dilution of commercial value of his name, and that was not applicable here either. In summary, the government had no valid publicity interest that could overcome the first amendment protections afforded to the political criticism in Elster’s mark. As such, the Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s decision.

Vidal v Elster before Supreme Court

In 2023, the Supreme court agreed to review the judgment in order to resolve whether the Lanham Act’s names clause violates the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court considered the issue as distinguishing between content-based, and content-neutral regulations of speech.

Content-based regulations target speech based on its communicative content and is presumptively unconstitutional. Viewpoint discrimination targets not merely subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on the subject. Trademark restrictions that discriminate based on viewpoint violate the first amendment.

Because the names clause doesn’t single out a trademark based on the specific motivating ideology or the opinion of the speaker, it doesn’t facially discriminate against any viewpoint. But it may still be found to discriminate on viewpoint in its practical operation. Elster suggested this was the case here because it would be easier to obtain a mark if it flattered rather than mocked a subject. But there are many reasons why a person might want to withhold consent to register a trademark bearing his name.

While the names clause is not viewpoint based, it is content based because it applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the message expressed, so it turns on whether the proposed trademark contains a person’s name.

The Supreme Court reasoned that although a content-based regulation of speech is presumptively unconstitutional, it had not decided whether heightened scrutiny extends to a content-based, but viewpoint-neutral, trademark restriction. Trademark rights have always coexisted with the first amendment, and the inherently content-based nature of trademark law has never been a cause for constitutional concern.

Restrictions on trademarking names have historically been grounded in the notion that a person has ownership over his own name, and that he may not be excluded from using that name by another’s trademark. So the court issued a narrow decision that, in this instance, the particular restriction does not violate the first amendment.