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The Impact of Third-Party Litigation Funding on Patent Disputes

A Patent’s Value Means Little Without the Means to Defend It

Valuing a patent isn’t simple. Methods like the cost, market, and income approaches are commonly used. But even a high-value patent may be worthless if its owner can’t afford to enforce it in court. Legal battles over patent rights are notoriously expensive, with median costs surpassing $3 million in some cases. For small patent holders, this financial barrier can put them at a major disadvantage. Especially when facing infringement by larger, better-resourced companies.

Icon of a US patent booklet

What Is Third-Party Litigation Funding (TPLF)?

Third-party litigation funding offers a potential solution. These firms provide financial support to litigants in exchange for a portion of any settlement or award. Importantly, TPLF is usually non-recourse—if the case is lost, the litigant owes nothing. Returns for funders can be significant, ranging from 200% to 400% or more. The growing number of TPLF firms in the U.S. since 2013 reflects the profitability of this model. For under-resourced patent owners, TPLF can level the playing field. It enables them to pursue cases they would otherwise have to abandon.

The Rise of Patent Trolls

However, TPLF has also fueled concerns about abuse. Non-practicing entities (NPEs), often called “patent trolls,” acquire patents solely to generate income through licensing or litigation. These entities exploit the system. When backed by TPLF, they gain the resources to aggressively pursue lawsuits, raising ethical and legal questions.

TPLF: Leveler or Enabler?

TPLF firms aren’t altruists; their funding decisions are driven by expected returns, not justice.

As a result, they’re more likely to fund cases with a high likelihood of success. Whether the claims serve a broader social good or not. When TPLF and NPEs align, the result may be more predatory litigation and fewer cases that actually promote innovation or fairness. Most courts don’t require disclosure of funding arrangements. This makes it even harder to determine whether TPLF is helping or harming the system.

The Debate Over Disclosure

A December 2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report examined TPLF’s role in patent litigation. It found that requiring disclosure of litigation funding could uncover conflicts of interest, reveal foreign involvement, and encourage settlements. If defendants realize their opponents are well-funded, they are incentivized to settle. On the other hand, funders argue that disclosure has no bearing on a case’s legal merits and could unfairly tip the scales in favor of defendants while adding administrative burdens to the courts.

The GAO report also noted a rise in TPLF-backed patent cases over the past five years. However, precise data is elusive due to the lack of disclosure requirements. One estimate suggests that over 60% of patent infringement lawsuits filed since 2020 have received third-party funding.

A Tool for Smaller Players—With Caveats

For small patent holders facing possible infringement, TPLF can provide a much-needed lifeline to defend their rights. Still, the system’s increasing complexity and potential for misuse raise valid concerns about transparency and fairness. As the debate over regulation continues, both benefits and drawbacks of TPLF remain under scrutiny.

For more information on valuing patents, try this section of our Patent FAQs: Valuing Patents

Generic Drug Label Doesn’t Induce Patent Infringement Just by Listing Optional Refrigeration

Generic Drug Labels and Inducement to Patent Infringement

In the ever-evolving world of pharmaceutical patent law, a recent Federal Circuit decision offers guidance on when a generic drug label may induce patent infringement. The case, Metacel Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Rubicon Research Private Ltd., focused on storage instructions for Rubicon’s generic version of Metacel’s Ozobax® oral baclofen solution.

Metacel held U.S. Patent No. 10,610,502, which included a method claim requiring storage of the baclofen solution at refrigerated temperatures between 2°C and 8°C. When Rubicon sought FDA approval through an ANDA, its proposed label instructed storage at room temperature but also stated that the product “can also be stored at 2°C to 8°C.”

Metacel argued that this optional refrigeration language would lead physicians and other healthcare providers to infringe the patented method. Both the District Court and the Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that Rubicon’s label did not induce infringement.

Federal Circuit Rejects Inducement Based on Optional Storage Instructions

The Federal Circuit’s analysis centered on whether Rubicon’s label encouraged or recommended infringement, as opposed to merely permitting it. The court emphasized that inducement requires affirmative encouragement of infringing conduct.

Here, the label’s primary instruction was to store the product at room temperature, which was non-infringing. The refrigeration language was framed as optional rather than mandatory.

Judge Lourie, writing for the panel, explained that the label conveyed that “if a downstream user decides to refrigerate the product, despite instructions to store the product at room temperature (which is noninfringing), then it should store the product at temperatures from 2°C to 8°C.” That permissive statement, the court held, did not amount to inducement.

Cartoon of a courtroom where a judge is asking a lawyer "How is that infringement?" The lawyer responds: "He said you could put it in the fridge!"

Permissive Label Language Does Not Induce Patent Infringement

The decision aligns with prior Federal Circuit precedent, including HZNP Meds. LLC v. Actavis Labs. UT, Inc. In that case, the court similarly held that permissive label language does not necessarily encourage infringement, particularly where the label does not require performance of the patented method.

The key distinction is between language that merely allows a potentially infringing use and language that directs or recommends it. Where a label primarily instructs users toward a non-infringing use, optional references to infringing conditions are generally insufficient to establish inducement.

ANDA Statements Cannot Override the Drug Label’s Instructions

Metacel also relied on statements Rubicon made in its ANDA regarding refrigeration. However, both courts rejected that argument.

The Federal Circuit reiterated that inducement analysis focuses on what healthcare providers actually see and follow. That means the operative document is the drug label, not internal regulatory filings. Statements made during the ANDA process cannot transform otherwise permissive label language into inducement.

The relevant question remains whether the label itself instructs users to perform the patented method.

ANDA Statements Cannot Override the Drug Label’s Instructions

The court further emphasized that when label language is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence cannot override its plain meaning. Even circumstantial evidence suggesting potential infringing use is insufficient where the label does not affirmatively encourage that use.

This reinforces the importance of careful label drafting. Courts will rely on the actual words presented to end users, rather than speculative interpretations or regulatory background materials.

Implications for Generic Drug Labels and Patent Inducement Claims

This decision confirms that generic drug manufacturers retain some flexibility when drafting labels. Including optional information does not automatically create inducement liability, provided the label’s primary instructions direct users toward non-infringing conduct.

For patentees, the case highlights the difficulty of establishing inducement based solely on permissive label language. For generic manufacturers, it underscores the value of precise wording that distinguishes between required instructions and optional conditions.

Ultimately, Metacel v. Rubicon serves as a reminder that in patent inducement cases, label language matters—and clarity can be decisive.

Related articles on patent law infringement cases: Divided Infringement

De Minimus Defense Doesn’t Necessarily Mean Minimal Use

Federal Circuit to AI Innovators: Generic Machine Learning Isn’t Enough for a Patent

In a closely watched decision, the Federal Circuit delivered a clear message. Simply applying machine learning to a new domain is not enough. Unless the ML itself improves, the invention will not qualify for a patent.

In Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp. (No. 2023-2437, Apr. 18, 2025), the court affirmed dismissal of four patents. Those patents were held by Recentive Analytics. Each focused on using machine learning for TV broadcast scheduling and event planning.

Although the court acknowledged AI’s growing importance, it drew a firm boundary. Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 still requires more.

Federal Circuit Decision on AI Patent Eligibility

At its core, the case addresses a pressing question. When does applying artificial intelligence make an invention patent-eligible?

According to the Federal Circuit, Section 101 applies fully to AI-related inventions. Merely invoking machine learning will not suffice. Instead, the patent must claim a concrete technological improvement.

In other words, automation alone is not innovation.

The Patents at Issue in Recentive Analytics v. Fox

Recentive’s patents fell into two categories.

Machine Learning Training Patents

First, the training patents claimed systems for generating optimized live event schedules. These schedules relied on historical data. The goal was dynamic, real-time optimization.

Network Map Patents

Second, the network map patents addressed channel assignments. They focused on how television programs were distributed across regions and times.

Overall, the inventions aimed to replace manual scheduling. In its place, they proposed automated optimization using machine learning.

Why the Federal Circuit Found the AI Patents Ineligible

The court emphasized a central principle. Generic machine learning methods are abstract ideas. Without a specific technological improvement, they remain ineligible. Applying ML to a manual task, such as TV scheduling, did not change the outcome. Section 101 requires more than digitizing an existing process.  As the court explained:

“Patents that do no more than claim the application of generic machine learning to new data environments… are patent ineligible under § 101.”

That language leaves little room for doubt.

Why the Machine Learning Patents Failed Under Section 101

Several deficiencies proved fatal to the claims.

No New Machine Learning Technology

Importantly, Recentive admitted it did not invent a new ML algorithm. Rather, it used existing techniques. The court viewed this as little more than saying “do it with AI.” A new application alone was not enough.

No Specific Implementation Details

Equally problematic, the patents lacked technical detail. They did not explain how the ML models operated. 

Nor did they describe any improvement to computer functionality. Without that specificity, the claims remained abstract.

Limiting AI to a Field of Use Is Not Enough

Recentive argued that applying ML to broadcasting made the invention patentable. However, the court disagreed. Limiting an abstract idea to one industry does not make it less abstract. This principle has appeared repeatedly in Section 101 cases.

Increased Speed Does Not Equal Patent Eligibility

The patents also emphasized efficiency and automation. Yet faster processing does not automatically create eligibility. Courts have long rejected speed alone as an inventive concept. That reasoning applied here as well.

No Inventive Concept Under the Alice Framework

Finally, the court considered step two of the Alice framework. Even there, it found nothing “significantly more” than the abstract idea itself. As a result, the claims failed both steps of the analysis.

An inventor argues: "Did you hear me? I used "AI"...". The examiner responds: "Yeah, that's not an invention."

What This Decision Means for AI and Machine Learning Patents

Taken together, the ruling draws a bright line. Using AI is not the same as improving AI.

For patent eligibility, applicants must identify a specific technological advance. Simply automating a manual workflow will not suffice. Likewise, applying known techniques to new data will not qualify.

Importantly, the decision does not eliminate AI patents altogether. Innovations that enhance machine learning technology may still succeed. However, the claims must show real technical progress.

Key Takeaways for AI Patent Applicants

As AI becomes embedded in more industries, scrutiny will increase. Section 101 remains a powerful filter.

Therefore, patent applicants should focus on technical improvements. Detailed implementation matters. Concrete advances in machine learning matter even more.

Without those elements, AI-based claims may struggle to survive.

The Fintiv Pendulum Swings Back — What Patent Litigators Need to Know

picture showing the Fintiv factors on the left, where the discretionary denials were based on more known and established factors, and the situation on the left, where the discretionary denials are based on factors that are less known- represented as a black box.

The rule book and the black box

The Use of the Inter Partes Review in Infringement Accusations

You’re facing an infringement suit. A common defensive tactic is to challenge the validity of the patent claims asserted against you through an Inter Partes Review (IPR). In an IPR, the petitioner asks the PTAB to cancel one or more patent claims that are asserted in court.

Discretionary Denial of an IPR

Given that this is such a common tactic, the PTAB can’t just institute an IPR upon request. This would tie up too many resources on frivolous, time-wasting challenges. So the rule, 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), says:

“The Director may not authorize an IPR… unless…there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition.”

The Director first assesses whether the petition meets the merits threshold. Even if that threshold is met, the Director may still exercise discretion to deny institution based on policy factors.

2020 Apple v. Fintiv Produces the “Fintiv factors” for IPR Denial

Fintiv sued Apple for infringement in late 2018, and the case was still pending into 2019.
Apple filed for an IPR, as one does, to challenge the validity of Fintiv’s patents, at the end of Oct 2019.
Then the District Court set the trial date for Nov 2020.

The November 2020 trial date caused Fintiv to argue that the PTAB should deny institution. The PTAB articulated six “Fintiv factors” to guide discretionary denials in situations with parallel litigation. These factors apply only when overlapping court proceedings exist—not to every IPR—but because parallel litigation is so common, the framework affects many contested petitions. Fintiv structured discretionary denials based on efficiency and overlap, though a petition could still be instituted if the factors favored it.

2022 Vidal Memorandum Reduces Fintiv Factor Denials

Director Vidal issued a memorandum limiting the aggressive use of Fintiv factors. The guidance emphasized that compelling evidence of unpatentability or procedural safeguards like a Sotera stipulation should generally prevent denial based solely on parallel litigation.

2025 The Return of the Fintiv Framework

Acting Director Coke Stewart rescinded the Vidal Memorandum. She explained that the 2022 guidance was interim and tied to possible rulemaking, which never occurred. With its withdrawal, the PTAB returns to the broader discretionary denial practice under Fintiv, allowing the Board to fully consider the factors without the limitations imposed by Vidal’s memo.

Implications for Patent Stakeholders

For patent owners, the return of the Fintiv framework means timing is more important than ever. Accelerating district court proceedings or managing trial schedules strategically can influence whether a parallel IPR is instituted. For accused infringers, filing early IPR petitions and considering procedural tools—like Sotera stipulations or early motions to stay in court—can be critical to reduce risk of discretionary denial. Overall, both sides must now coordinate litigation and PTAB strategy carefully, because the Board once again has broad discretion to deny institution when overlapping litigation exists. Staying agile and planning for both forums simultaneously can make the difference in protecting or enforcing patent rights.

Federal Circuit Clarifies Limits on Prosecution Disclaimer Across Patent Families

Federal Circuit Limits Cross-Family Prosecution Disclaimer

In Maquet Cardiovascular LLC v. Abiomed Inc., the Federal Circuit clarified prosecution history disclaimer across related patents. The court vacated a district court judgment of non-infringement. It also provided guidance for patent prosecutors and litigators.

Case Background and District Court Ruling

Maquet sued Abiomed for infringing U.S. Patent No. 10,238,783 and its parent, U.S. Patent No. 9,789,238.

The district court relied on prosecution history from related patents. It applied two negative limitations to the asserted claims. Those added limitations narrowed claim scope. As a result, the court found non-infringement in favor of Abiomed.

Federal Circuit Reverses the Claim Construction

On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected that approach. The court emphasized that prosecution disclaimer does not automatically extend across related patents. 

Picture of a mom and two sons. The son on the left has a cast and crutches. Mom is telling the son on right "Billy, since your brother has to have crutches, you should use them too". This illustrates the District Court’s decision to base the outcome of one patent on the outcome of a related patent.

Instead, disclaimer applies only when claim language is substantially similar.

Key Takeaways on Prosecution History Disclaimer

This decision reinforces several important principles.

Substantial Similarity Between Claims Is Required

First, parity between claims matters. Prosecution disclaimer carries over only when claim language is substantially similar. Without that similarity, importing limitations from an earlier patent is improper.

Disclaimer Requires Clear and Unmistakable Statements

Second, disclaimer must be clear and unmistakable. Mere silence does not create disclaimer. 
Failure to dispute an examiner’s statement is not enough. Therefore, applicants do not need to respond to every reason for allowance.

IPR Statements Must Meet the Same High Standard

Third, the court addressed disclaimer during inter partes review. Statements made during IPR can support disclaimer. However, they must meet the same clear and unmistakable standard. Vague or broad statements generally will not limit claim scope.

Practical Guidance for Patent Prosecutors

This case offers practical guidance for patent professionals. First, differentiate claim language across related patents when appropriate. Doing so may reduce the risk of unintended limitations. Second, draft prosecution and IPR statements carefully. Avoid broad or ambiguous language that could narrow claim scope.

Finally, remember that silence is not automatic acquiescence. In many cases, there may be no need to contest every examiner comment.

Why the Maquet Decision Matters

Ultimately, Maquet helps preserve control over claim scope. It also limits the automatic spread of disclaimer across patent families.

As a result, patent owners have clearer boundaries when litigating related patents.

The Harsh Reality of § 101 Appeals: Why Fighting a Rejection at the PTAB Is an Uphill Battle

PTAB § 101 Affirmance Rates Continue to Climb

For inventors and patent practitioners, securing a patent has always been challenging. Overcoming a § 101 rejection is even harder. The latest 2023 data confirms a troubling trend. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board upheld examiner § 101 rejections 91% of the time. That number rose from 87.1% in 2021 and 88.4% in 2022. The trend makes one thing clear. Appealing a § 101 rejection usually ends in disappointment.

Why the PTAB Is So Tough on § 101 Appeals

The high affirmance rate is not just about weak applications. It reflects deeper structural problems.

Since the Supreme Court’s Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank decision, patent eligibility law has been unstable. The framework remains confusing and inconsistent.

The Federal Circuit has issued conflicting rulings. Meanwhile, the PTAB often disregards the USPTO’s own eligibility guidance. This inconsistency has produced strange outcomes. In some cases, a diamond-encrusted drill bit and a camera phone were labeled “abstract ideas.” As a result, applicants face unpredictable decisions. Outcomes often feel arbitrary rather than grounded in clear legal standards.

cartoon of the Patent Beast and an inventor illustrating what it must be like waging a PTAB section 101 appeal: unpleasant.

The Patent Beast as the PTAB

Which USPTO Technical Centers Are the Harshest?

Not all USPTO Technical Centers treat § 101 appeals equally. Some are significantly tougher than others.

TC3600 and TC3700: Business Methods and Financial Technology

These centers have the worst outcomes. Affirmance rates exceed 95%. Business method patents frequently land in these centers. Inventors in these fields face especially steep odds.

TC2100: Computing and Software Technologies

TC2100’s affirmance rate climbed to 85% in 2023. It stood at 80% in 2022. This increase suggests broader trouble for software patents. The impact extends beyond business methods.

Other Technical Centers

Some technical centers show lower affirmance rates. However, the data is limited. TC2400 and TC2600 may offer slightly better outcomes for software-related applications. Still, results vary.

The Most Common “Abstract Idea” Categories

The PTAB typically relies on three main categories when affirming § 101 rejections.

  • Mathematics (17% of affirmances)
  • Mental processes (48%)
  • Methods of organizing human activity (68%)

These categories often overlap. Some applications are rejected under multiple rationales.

Mental process rejections are common in TC2100. Organizing human activity dominates TC3600 decisions.

The Hidden Risk: New § 101 Rejections on Appeal

Even if an examiner does not issue a § 101 rejection, risk remains. The PTAB can introduce one. In 10% of cases, the PTAB issued a new § 101 rejection. These applicants were caught off guard. This risk is especially high in TC2100. Examiners there may be more lenient during prosecution. The PTAB often is not.

Strategic Options for Responding to a § 101 Rejection

Given these statistics, appealing is rarely the best first move. Strategic prosecution decisions matter more than ever.

Applicants should consider several approaches.

  1. Work with the examiner to amend claims and pursue allowance before appealing.
  2. Use TC steering tools to anticipate assignment outcomes.
  3. Avoid TC3600 and TC3700 when possible.
  4. Carefully evaluate claim amendments before filing any appeal.

When an appeal is unavoidable, preparation is critical. Expect a difficult path.

Final Thoughts on § 101 Appeals at the PTAB

The PTAB’s 91% affirmance rate in 2023 is a serious warning. The system remains inconsistent and difficult to navigate.

Legislative or judicial reform may eventually bring clarity. Until then, early prosecution strategy is essential.

Once an application reaches the PTAB, the odds of reversal are slim.

Check out our FishFAQ video: Rejections

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