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Copyright Office Report on AI Training and Fair Use
Can AI systems use copyrighted materials under the fair use doctrine?
The fair use doctrine is a provision of copyright law that allows for limited usage of copyrighted material in certain situations without needing to obtain permission from the copyright holder. There is a four-factor test used to determine fair use: the character of the use, nature of the work, amount used, and effect upon the market. These are general guidelines and use for one of these purposes is not automatically fair, while other purposes beyond these might be considered fair.
Some of the purposes where fair use is generally allowed are: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. So, for example, quotes from a copyrighted book can be published in a critique of the book without having to obtain permission from the copyright holder.
Of course, generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems train on looking at large amounts of data, including copyrighted materials. Can this be considered fair use and avoid infringement? This was the scope of the recent study put out by the United States Copyright Office (the USCO).
Do AI models Infringe Training Data?
The USCO report finds that generative AI systems implicate several of the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners. The report also addresses whether the model’s weights are themselves infringing copies of the underlying works. This is disputed, with developers asserting that models are merely comprised of strings of numbers, while others assert as evidence to the contrary that models sometimes generate outputs substantially similar to the training data. The report concludes that where generated outputs are substantially similar, it is a strong argument that copying the model’s weights implicates the reproduction and derivative work rights of the original works.
The Application of the Fair-Use Defense
The key issue when analyzing fair use has been whether the use is “transformative”. There is of course a spectrum, and where the output is based on a diverse dataset, it is more likely to be transformative, but where it is trained to generate outputs substantially similar to copyrighted works, then it is “at best, modestly transformative”. The USCO rejected arguments that AI training is inherently transformative, because it is analogous to human learning. The report asserts that the analogy rests on a faulty premise that fair use is a defense for all acts if those acts are used for learning. But an example was given that a student couldn’t rely on fair use to copy all of the books at a library. The analogy also fails because humans retain only imperfect impressions of the works experienced, filtered through their unique personalities and limitations. AI involves training on the creation of perfect copies. The structure of exclusive copyright rights is premised on certain human limitations.
There are more than 40 cases currently pending related to the issue of AI using copyrighted materials. There won’t be a single answer whether unauthorized use is fair use. There is an ongoing discussion of some form of licensing scheme for AI training data, but for now, the recommendation is to continue development without government intervention.
Revised Policy on Same-Day Dual Filings in China: Invention and Utility Model Applications
There are two types of patent protection in China: Invention patents, which are similar to utility patents in the US; and utility model patents (similar to petty or minor patents), which may be granted for technical solutions that relate to shapes or structures of a product.
Under Chinese patent law, when the same applicant files both an invention patent application and a utility model application for the same invention on the same day (i.e., same filing date), it is considered a same-day dual filing. Whether these applications relate to the same invention is determined based on a declaration made in the request form.
To obtain a patent for the invention, the applicant must waive the corresponding utility model right. The previous practice of amending the invention application to distinguish it from the utility model is no longer permitted under the revised rules.
Background (Previous Practice):
Previously, if the utility model right was still valid and a declaration was submitted at the time of filing, applicants had two options:
- Modify the invention application to differentiate it from the utility model, or
- Waive the utility model right.
Current Practice (Amended Rules):
Now, only the second option—waiving the utility model right—is allowed. This amendment is intended to streamline examination procedures and reduce the burden on both applicants and the patent office.
Implications for Applicants:
At the time of filing in China, applicants should carefully assess:
- Whether dual filing (for both invention and utility model) is necessary—especially if the scopes of protection are the same.
- If the scopes are identical, whether to pursue protection via a utility model or an invention patent.
What Did Those Claims Consist Of?
This is a very weird case interpreting “consisting of”. The Federal Circuit recently affirmed a ruling of non-infringement in Azurity Pharmaceuticals v. Alkem Laboratories. Azurity had sued Alkem for allegedly infringing patent claims related to a drinkable antibiotic.
The patent at issue—Azurity’s U.S. Patent No. 10,959,948—was a continuation of an earlier application that had been rejected due to prior art referencing the ingredient propylene glycol. To overcome that rejection, Azurity amended its claims to disclaim propylene glycol, arguing that its absence distinguished the invention from the prior art. Instead, Azurity used the more generic term “flavoring agent.”
At trial, both parties stipulated that “flavoring agents” in the asserted claims could include substances with or without propylene glycol. Azurity argued that this meant a product containing a flavoring agent with propylene glycol would still infringe, regardless of the claim’s “consisting of” language.
The district court disagreed. It held that Alkem’s product—though it did contain propylene glycol—did not infringe the asserted claims because Azurity had clearly and unmistakably disclaimed that ingredient during prosecution.
As a reminder, in patent claim language:
- “Comprising” means the invention includes the listed elements, but may also include others.
- “Consisting of” is much narrower—it limits the invention strictly to the elements explicitly listed, excluding anything else.
The court concluded that Azurity’s use of “consisting of,” along with its prosecution history, was clear enough to exclude propylene glycol—and, by extension, Alkem’s product—from the scope of the claims.
Mission Impossible: Trademarking the US SPACE FORCE
In a recent ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to deny registration of the trademark “US SPACE FORCE”—a case that offers a fascinating look at how intellectual property law interacts with national identity.
The Background
The term “Space Force” entered the public spotlight in March 2018, when then-President Donald Trump announced plans for a new branch of the military focused on space. By December 2019, the United States Space Force was officially established as the sixth branch of the U.S. Armed Forces.
However, just days after Trump’s 2018 announcement, intellectual property attorney Thomas Foster filed an application to register the trademark “US SPACE FORCE” for a range of goods and services, on behalf of his law firm. The timing was strategic—but ultimately not enough to secure the rights to the name.
The USPTO’s Rejection
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) initially refused the application under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. This section bars trademarks that falsely suggest a connection with a person, institution, belief, or national symbol.
Foster appealed to the TTAB, which affirmed the USPTO’s refusal. He then requested a reconsideration, which was denied, and ultimately escalated the matter to the Federal Circuit Court.
The Legal Argument: Timing and Association
Foster’s main argument was that the trademark should be evaluated based on the facts at the time the application was filed, not on developments that occurred afterward—such as the formal establishment of the Space Force in 2019.
The court disagreed. It ruled that the proper time for evaluating whether a mark falsely suggests a connection is during the examination of the application, not when it was initially filed. This distinction was crucial, as by the time the application was examined, the U.S. government had clearly signaled its intent to use the name for a new military branch.
The Four-Part False Connection Test
To determine whether a mark falsely suggests a connection, courts apply a four-part test:
- the mark is the same as, or a close approximation of, the name or identity previously used by another person or institution;
- the mark would be recognized as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution;
- the person or institution named by the mark is not connected with the activities performed by the applicant under the mark; and
- the fame or reputation of the person or institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s goods or services, a connection with the person or institution would be presumed.
In this case, all four elements were met. “US SPACE FORCE” clearly pointed to a well-known, official government entity with no ties to Foster’s firm.
What the Court Emphasized
Importantly, the court clarified that the mark doesn’t have to be identical to a government name to create a false suggestion of connection. Even though the U.S. Space Force wasn’t formally in existence when the application was filed, the name “US SPACE FORCE” was unmistakably tied to the United States.
Foster attempted to bolster his argument by citing fictional uses of “Space Force” in pop culture, such as TV shows—but the court was unmoved. The unique and unmistakable association with a newly announced military institution outweighed any prior fictional use.
Final Thoughts
This case serves as a reminder that timing, context, and public perception are critical in trademark law—especially when national identity is at play. For attorneys and businesses alike, it underscores the importance of understanding not just what a mark says, but what it implies to the public.
Decluttering the USPTO’s Trademark Register
The USPTO recently announced it had now removed over 50,000 goods and services from the trademark register. Using ex parte expungement and reexamination proceedings, the majority of the cancellations were used against registrations linked to specimen farms.
Trademark registration requires that marks be used in real-life commerce. Specimens of the marks must be provided to the USPTO to demonstrate commercial usage prior to registration. This would serve to show a legitimate connection between the mark and the goods and services provided.
Specimen farms are websites designed to look like commercial sites. These sites list the products and the marks, which are used as specimens provided to the PTO. But the sites don’t actually sell the product.
There are filing firms, companies that assist in filing trademark applications, that created these e-commerce sites purely for the purpose of creating fake specimens.
Clearly the registry of these unused goods and services helps open up the path for legitimate companies and trademarks.
Patent Like You Mean It, But Also Show the Structure
Preliminary stuff
Means-plus-function claiming is a way of writing a patent that describes what something does, not how it does it. For example, describing a machine that opens a jar, rather than describing all the parts- a motor, a gripper, and how they work together, you just say: “A means for opening a jar”. This is to say you want to protect whatever part does the opening of the jar, without naming the exact part.
However, the actual parts, the structure, must be described elsewhere in the patent. This is a way to write less in the claims, but the downside is if it doesn’t describe how it works well enough, the claim might be invalid.
Section 112(f) addresses means-plus-function claiming. The courts have a two-step analysis for such claims. First, determine whether the claim limitation is drafted in a means-plus-function format, which would invoke Sec 112(f). Second, if it is, identify what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.
In any cases lacking disclosed structure, the claim is invalid under Sec 112(b), dealing with claim definiteness. In simple terms, a patent must clearly tell others what is being claimed so they know the boundaries of the invention. Clear claims can be understood, competitors can avoid infringement, and courts can enforce the patent consistently.
Vague or ambiguous claims can be ruled invalid for indefiniteness, which is especially relevant in means-plus-function claims. If the patent application doesn’t describe the structure that performs the function, it may be invalid.
Fintive v. PayPal
In a significant ruling that reinforces the high bar for software claim clarity, the Federal Circuit recently affirmed the invalidation of several Fintiv, Inc. patents due to indefiniteness. The decision in Fintiv, Inc. v. PayPal Holdings, Inc. (No. 2023-2312, Apr. 30, 2025) is a clear message to patent drafters: functional language in software claims needs structural backing—or risk getting wiped out under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The Core Issue: Functional Terms with No Structure
At the heart of the case were terms like “payment handler” and “payment handler service,” found in Fintiv’s asserted patents. These terms were intended to cover components that interface with various payment APIs. But the court found they lacked inherent structural meaning and instead described what the component does rather than what it is.
This triggered the court’s application of the means-plus-function analysis under § 112(f)—even though the word “means” wasn’t used.
Why Fintiv Lost
Fintiv tried to argue that “payment handler” had a recognized meaning in the art, citing dictionaries, examples from the patent, and even the Internet Open Trading Protocol. But the court was unconvinced. It found that these terms merely recited functions—such as wrapping APIs or exposing common interfaces—without explaining how the functions were implemented. Essentially, “payment handler” was treated like a black box.
The specification didn’t help either. Instead of disclosing a specific algorithm or structure, it restated the functional goals. According to the court, that’s not enough under § 112(f). A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) wouldn’t be able to implement the invention based solely on the description provided.
So functional terms, even if they sound technical, can lead to invalidation if the specifications don’t back them up with a structure, which for software patents, usually means an algorithm. It should also remind you that just because you avoided the word ‘means’ doesn’t mean you’ve avoided ‘means-plus-function’ treatment. The court will look at substance, not just form.
Who Gets Credit When AI Invents? A Look at the History—and Future—of Inventorship
For centuries, governments have tried to encourage innovation by offering inventors something valuable in return: ownership. The earliest forms of state-recognized intellectual property—like patents—were meant to reward people for coming up with new solutions to problems. But it hasn’t always worked the way we’d like to imagine.
From Royal Favors to Inventor Rights
Between the 14th and 17th centuries, the English crown handed out patents. But these weren’t always about protecting brilliant ideas—sometimes they were just political favors, granting monopoly rights to the well-connected.
Things began to shift in the 18th century. Under Queen Anne, inventors had to submit detailed specifications explaining how their inventions worked. This marked a move toward recognizing patents not as tools of privilege, but as protections for genuine intellectual contributions.
In the U.S., this principle was written into the Constitution. The Patent and Copyright Clause gave Congress the power to protect inventors’ rights “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” James Madison himself argued that useful inventions belonged to those who created them. By the late 1800s, several countries—including England, France, and Germany—had formal patent laws recognizing inventors’ intellectual ownership.
The Core of Modern Inventorship: Conception
Today, especially in U.S. patent law, inventorship hinges on a key concept: conception. The inventor isn’t necessarily the person who builds the invention, but the one who conceives it—the one who had the original idea.
Some ground rules:
- Only someone who contributes to the mental formulation of the invention can be an inventor.
- There can be multiple inventors, but each must contribute to at least one claim in the patent.
- Simply carrying out instructions or building a prototype? That’s not inventorship.
Over time, the legal system evolved from handing out monopolies to truly honoring the individuals behind technological progress—those whose ideas shaped the future.
Then Came Generative AI
In recent years, AI has complicated things.
Autonomous AI systems can now generate ideas, designs, and even prototypes. But who’s the inventor when a machine contributes core ideas? Most global patent offices, including the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), say only a natural person—a human—can be listed as an inventor.
The courts have backed this up. In Thaler v. Vidal, the Federal Circuit ruled that AI can’t be an inventor under current U.S. law. However, that ruling left a critical question open: What about inventions developed by humans working with AI?
The USPTO’s 2024 AI Guidance
In early 2024, the USPTO released new guidance aimed at clarifying this gray area. The agency said that a human can be listed as an inventor of an AI-assisted invention if they make a “significant contribution” to the final invention—even if they didn’t fully conceive it.
This marks a shift. Under this standard, a person could take AI-generated output, shape it meaningfully, and claim inventorship—even if their input alone wouldn’t qualify as an invention.
Legal Risks on the Horizon
This softer standard raises eyebrows in the legal community. Critics argue it contradicts patent law’s long-standing requirement of full human conception. And because USPTO guidance doesn’t carry the force of law, patents issued under this standard might not hold up in court.
There’s also risk for patent attorneys. Filing patents based on this weakened inventorship standard could raise ethical issues under the duty of disclosure rules, especially if the AI did most of the heavy lifting.
And here’s a surprising twist: the USPTO’s standard for inventorship may now be lower than the standard for patentability itself.
Looking Ahead
We’re at a crossroads. On one hand, AI is a powerful tool for accelerating innovation. On the other, our current legal framework still centers on human inventorship.
Without new legislation or clearer judicial rulings, this tension will likely grow. For now, inventors, companies, and patent attorneys should tread carefully. The future of inventorship in the AI era is still being written—and it’s far from settled.